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From the Russian Revolution to 
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Abstract: The Cuban Communist 
Party was the most significant 
working-class response to 
the Russian Revolution in the 
Caribbean. Recent research shows 
that organised workers played a 
decisive role in the outcome of the 
Cuban Revolution, but if the working 
class role has been hidden from 
history, the revolutionary activity 
of Afro-Cuban workers has been 
doubly obscured. There is a direct 
connection that links the Russian 
Revolution to the Cuban Revolution.
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Resumo: O Partido Comunista 
Cubano foi a mais expressiva resposta 
à Revolução Russa no Caribe. 
Pesquisas recentes mostram que os 
trabalhadores organizados tiveram 
um papel decisivo no resultado da 
Revolução Cubana, mas, se o papel 
da classe operária foi omitido na 
história, a atividade revolucionária 
dos trabalhadores afro-cubanos foi 
duplamente obscurecida. Há uma 
conexão direta que liga a Revolução 
Russa à Revolução Cubana.
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1 INTRODuCTION
Just over 40 years separate the Russian and Cuban Revolutions, 
but they seem a world apart. The first, at least in its early stages, 
was a classic workers’ revolution. The Cuban Revolution, however, 
has presented a much more complicated picture, with the standard 
historiography stressing the role of a guerrilla vanguard and seeing 
little or no role for the proletariat as seen in classic Marxist theory. 
However, recent research has shown a much greater involvement 
by organised labour, so perhaps there is a more significant “red 
thread” linking the two revolutions (CUSHION, 2016a). The Partido 
Comunista de Cuba (PCC, Cuban Communist Party), formed in 1925, 
was the most significant response to the Russian Revolution in the 
Caribbean and it also provided an organisational home for many 
Afro-Cuban working class militants. But if the working-class role 
has been hidden from history, the revolutionary activity of Afro-
Cuban workers has been doubly obscured. This article will trace 
the history of the Afro-Cuban relationship with communism from 
the party’s foundation through to the rebel triumph: that is, from 
the Russian Revolution to the Cuban Revolution.
2 BACkGROuND
By the middle of the Nineteenth Century, Cuba and Puerto Rico 
were all that remained of the once vast Spanish empire in the 
Americas. The rest  of the empire had gained its independence 
from Spain in a series of bitter wars that started in 1810 and finally 
ground to a halt in the middle of the 1820s, although Spain only 
renounced sovereignty over all of continental America in 1836 
(CHASTEEN, 2006). The Cuban economy was based on plantation 
slavery and fear of slave revolt outweighed any desire for inde-
pendence on the part of the slave-owning creole oligarchy, while 
many loyalists fled from the newly independent republics and a 
large proportion of the defeated Spanish army were redeployed to 
the island. This fear of their enslaved labour force by the local elite 
and the large military presence placed great obstacles in the path 
of cuban independence, but the loyalism of their owners gave the 
enslaved afro-cuban population every reason to believe that their 
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best chance for emancipation lay with supporting the struggle for 
national independence (PINO-SANTOS, 1964).
In order to understand the place of Afro-Cuban politics in the 
wider Cuban context, it is first necessary to look at the form that 
resistance to slavery took in Cuba. The demographics of the island 
were such that Afro-Cubans in general and slaves in particular 
were in a minority, as there was a substantial free peasant farming 
population of Spanish heritage. There were also large numbers 
of people of mixed African and European heritage, or mulatos, 
and free people of colour. There had been several anti-slavery 
conspiracies and localised rebellions in the 18th and early 19th 
century, but by the 1850s, most Afro-Cubans pinned their hopes 
for freedom and equality on fighting alongside the nationalists of 
European descent. 
By the late 1860s, the east of the island was in crisis; many 
planters were heavily in debt and resented their lack of political 
rights. So when Carlos Manuel de Céspedes freed his slaves in 
1868, armed them and called for an uprising, he struck a wides-
pread chord. In the resulting Ten Years War, thousands of slaves 
fled from their plantations and joined the rebel army. The upri-
sing was defeated by the Spanish forces but it took 10 years and 
eastern Cuba was devastated. The final peace treaty between the 
government and the leaders of the rebel forces granted freedom to 
all those slaves who had fought in both the rebel and the royalist 
armies. The peace only lasted a year and the war broke out again, 
with the rebel forces led by an Afro-Cuban rebel general, Antonio 
Maceo and his brother José. But Spanish forces defeated Maceo’s 
troops in 1880. Under cover of the fighting, many slaves just fled to 
the remote mountains between Santiago and Guantanamo where 
they lived by subsistence farming. Their descendants would provi-
de a valuable base for the liberated area set up by Raul Castro 
and Juan Almeida almost eighty years later, in 1958. The freeing of 
those slaves who had rebelled, while those who had not remained 
enslaved, so seriously undermined the institution that the colonial 
administration abolished slavery in 1886 (FERRER, 1999).
The other long term importance of the Ten Years War was the 
greatly increased patriotic sentiment, while the experience of black 
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and white fighting alongside one another became a central part of 
the nationalist ideology.  Cuban rebel patriots began to define their 
nation in terms of anti-racism in contrast with the European colo-
nisation of Africa and the growth of the Jim Crow laws that enfor-
ced racial segregation in the Southern United States.. There was 
a considerable gap between rhetoric and practice, but it did give 
Cuban civil rights activists a useful ideological tool with which to 
attack official racism. It also set a pattern whereby the much more 
Afro-Cuban east of the island came to see itself as Oriente rebelde 
(or Rebellious East). 
The war for independence broke out again in 1895 in a context 
of an economic crisis. The Maceo brothers were again important 
leaders and Afro-Cubans provided much of the rank and file of the 
rebel army. The revolution gave them a gun and thereby a stake in 
society. The USA invaded in 1898 and, while initially welcomed by 
the rebels, quickly proved by their racist contempt for all Cubans 
that this was just another imperial conquest (FONER, 1972). They 
officially left in 1902, leaving a nominally independent Cuba, but 
in reality the new country was completely dominated by US capital 
and subject to military threats any time Cuban radicals contested 
the US puppet government.(PÉREZ, 1990; IBARRA CUESTA, 1998; 
FONER, 1972). 
There were two attempts at independent political organi-
sation by Afro-Cubans, the Partido Independiente de Color (PIC, 
Independent Party of Coloured People) in 1908 and the United 
Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) in the late 20s. The PIC, 
which was centred in the East, was set up by Afro-Cuban veterans 
of the War of Independence who felt the nationalist ideology of 
racial equality was hollow. They staged a revolt in 1912 that was 
in reality a peaceful but armed demonstration. This was brutally 
repressed with as many as 6,000, both active participants and civi-
lian bystanders, being massacred by the army with the help of US 
Marines from the Guantanamo base (CASTRO FERNÁNDEZ, 2008). 
The United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which was 
led by Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican-born black nationalist who crea-
ted a Back to Africa movement in the United States, had conside-
rable presence in Cuba during 1920s, again mainly in the east. But 
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the membership was largely confined to immigrant sugar workers 
from Jamaica, Trinidad and Dominica as well as among the Haitian 
immigrant workforce, although records have been found of at 
least one Spanish-speaking chapter in Santiago de Cuba (RIVERO, 
2005). Given the racism that so many immigrants suffered, the 
UNIA became largely a self-help association for workers from other 
Caribbean islands. The big difference between the two organisa-
tions was that the Partido Independiente de Color represented black 
Cubans who were discriminated against and who were claiming 
their rights as Cuban nationals. The UNIA was a largely immigrant 
organisation that had no such national rights to claim and whose 
public face spoke of the homeland in Africa (RIVERO, 2005).
In any case, in the racist backlash that derailed the 1933 
Cuban revolution, most of the British West Indian workers were 
deported to Jamaica. Many Jamaican immigrants also joined the 
Cuban Communist Party (PCC), which had been founded in 1925, 
and indeed there was considerable overlap with the UNIA despi-
te the apparent political differences. While most British West 
Indian workers were temporary residents, by the early 1930s some 
Jamaicans had become Cuban citizens. At the port of Nuevitas, for 
example, the leaders of the dock workers were mostly Jamaican 
and Haitian and most of these immigrants were also Cuban citi-
zens (FUENTE, 1997, p. 44). Hugh Clifford Buchanan, one of the 
first Marxists in Jamaica, worked in Cuba in the 1920s, where he 
had been a member of the UNIA and had close contacts with the 
PCC (HART, 2002).
3 PARTIDO COMuNISTA DE CuBA
In the period after the First World War, most Cubans felt that 
independence was merely formal, that the establishment of the 
Republic had vastly increased the already-present penetration of 
the economy by US capital and that corruption had become ende-
mic. Cuban workers reacted to a deterioration in their social condi-
tions by beginning to organise on a class basis. Between 1917 and 
1920, more than 220 partial and general strikes occurred, affecting 
a wide range of industries across the whole the island. Out of this 
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wave of industrial action, the second National Workers’ Congress 
emerged in 1920, becoming the first united trade union organi-
sation to cover the whole country. This formed part of a radical 
nationalist opposition milieu that developed from a new genera-
tion challenging the political domination of the veterans of the War 
of Independence of 1895-98. In the second decade of the twentieth 
century, a speculative boom known as the Dance of the Millions, 
largely financed by loans from US banks, had collapsed and most of 
the Cuban industry had passed into American ownership when the 
banks foreclosed (POLLITT, 2004). Sugar was always the backbone 
of the Cuban economy and the sugar price crisis of 1920-21 caused 
great political instability and a large number of strikes in 1923. 
From this situation, new political alliances started to emerge.
The Partido Comunista de Cuba (PCC, Communist Party of Cuba) 
grew out of three strands of this new opposition: radical students 
around Julio Antonio Mella; artists and intellectuals such as the 
writer Rubén Martínez Villena; and trade unionists like Alfredo 
López, who played a key role in the foundation of the first natio-
nal trade union confederation, the Confederación Nacional Obrera 
de Cuba (CNOC, National Workers’ Confederation of Cuba). These 
strands initially coalesced in the Universidad Popular José Martí 
(José Martí People’s University), which acted as a forum for politi-
cal education and debate, as well as a social space where workers, 
students, intellectuals and artists could come together with the 
intention of creating a “cultural counter-hegemony” (HATZKY, 
2008, p. 121). For this generation, the Russian Revolution, of 
which little specific information was available, held huge symbolic 
importance as it legitimated the concept of revolution as the road 
to modernity (WHITNEY, 2001).
When a communist party was established in 1925, the question 
of “race” was not discussed at the founding congress and none 
of the 13 delegates were of African descent. The main focus was 
on anti-imperialist activity, aiming towards an alliance of radi-
cal nationalists committed to the struggle for social justice which 
took the organisational form of the Liga Anti-Imperialista de Cuba 
(LAIC, Anti-Imperialist League of Cuba). LAIC was founded by Julio 
Antonio Mella, also the leading light in the newly formed PCC 
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(KERSFFELD, 2009, p. 17-25). The beginnings of the PCC were far 
from easy as they coincided with a hardening of the repression 
under the dictatorship of President Gerardo Machado. 
Faced with a series of strikes in 1925, the government started 
to use the army and police to eliminate opposition. The first victim 
was the railway workers’ leader, Enrique Varona, who had recently 
organised a railway strike in solidarity with striking sugar workers; 
he was shot by the police in full public view (ZANETTI; GARCíA, 
1987, p. 302). This repression quickly fell on the newly-formed 
communist party when, two weeks after its founding conference, 
200 communists were arrested and the party general secretary, 
José Miguel Pérez, an immigrant from the Canaries, was deported. 
When José Antonio Mella was arrested, he began a hunger strike. 
While this tactic was eventually successful and he was released in 
January 1926, it was in defiance of a party instruction not to conti-
nue and he was expelled for indiscipline from the party that he had 
been instrumental in founding. Danger of assassination by the regi-
me forced Mella to flee into exile in Mexico, where he was warmly 
welcomed by his Mexican comrades and Cuba’s loss became 
Mexico’s gain as he contributed greatly to the development of the 
growth of communism in his new home. This self-inflicted wound 
was strongly criticised both within the Komintern and within the 
broader milieu of the movement in opposition to the dictatorship. 
It seriously undermined the fledgling party’s influence.
The Communist International (Komintern) arose from the 
Russian Revolution as an international party of world revolution 
and the national communist parties were, in theory, sections of the 
International. The Komintern, in a move aimed at setting up regio-
nal structures, established a hierarchy whereby weaker parties 
were assigned to the tutelage of “elder brother” parties. Given the 
sensitivity of the historical relations between the USA and Cuba, 
one wonders at the wisdom of assigning the Cuban party to the 
sphere of influence of the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA). 
Nevertheless, the Caribbean Bureau of the Komintern was based 
in New York under the watchful eye of the North American party. 
Nevertheless, it would have the effect of orienting the PCC to work 
amongst Afro-Cubans.
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4 kOMINTERN AND THE “NEGRO QuESTION” IN THE uSA
The early US communists had not taken the question of racism 
particularly seriously. Technically-correct positions on workers 
unity and on the decisive effects of racial divisions had not 
been translated into practical activity. Nevertheless, the CPUSA 
had recruited some important Afro-American and West Indian 
members, mainly in New York. The black members of the US 
delegation to the 6th Congress of the Communist International in 
1928 were strongly critical of the neglect of work amongst Afro-
Americans and they gained a sympathetic hearing in Moscow. 
The upheaval in the international communist movement resul-
ting from the adoption, at that same 6th Congress, of the so-called 
Third Period thesis, which condemned social democracy as social-
fascism, nevertheless resulted in a change of leadership in the 
CPUSA and the start of serious agitational work amongst Afro-
Americans in the US South (ZUMOFF, 2015, p. 330-352). In turn 
this led to a similar change in orientation in the Cuban party, which 
began equally serious agitation amongst Afro-Cubans, particularly 
in Oriente province in the east of the Island.  
As part of this reorientation, in 1929 the CPUSA raised the Right 
of Self-Determination in areas of the South with a black majo-
rity population, the so-called Black Belt”. The PCC then  adopted 
a similar position in 1932, even using a direct translation: Franja 
Negra. It has been hotly debated as to whether the subsequent 
successes in recruiting workers of African heritage were because 
of this policy, or despite it (ADI, 2013, p. 81-85; ZUMOFF, 2015, 
p. 341-355). The demand for self-determination was controver-
sial inside the PCC at the time and not widely publicised and was 
quietly dropped in 1935. Given the long tradition of Afro-Cubans 
fighting for civil rights and equality within the Cuban nation, as 
well as the importance of inter-racial solidarity in many impor-
tant workers struggles, it is unlikely that this demand would have 
attracted many recruits.
However, the debate on the Franja Negra did have the effect of 
initiating serious practical discussion inside the PCC about how to 
extend their influence and membership in the black community. 
The second party congress in February 1934 passed a self-critical 
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resolution deploring the “ineffectual work among the Negro 
masses” while setting up and prioritising a Comité Pro Derechos del 
Negro (Committee for Negro Rights) with equality and anti-discri-
mination now firmly in the programme (ROJAS BLAQUIER, 2005, 
p. 206-236). But it was the party’s determined involvement in the 
sugar strikes of 1933 that would really allow them to recruit large 
numbers of Afro-Cuban workers, including some important black 
workers’ leaders.
5 1933 REVOLuTION
In 1930, the US Congress greatly increased tariffs on impor-
ted sugar which exacerbated the already serious impact on the 
Cuban sugar industry of restricted markets and shrinking prices 
outside the USA. This, combined with the depressing effects of the 
Wall Street Crash of 1929, led to a general strike in that same year 
(POLLITT, 2004). On advice from the Komintern Caribbean Bureau, 
the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) and the Cuban National Workers 
Confederation (CNOC) made a priority of organising amongst 
workers in the sugar industry, leading in December 1932 to the 
founding of the Sindicato Nacional Obrero de la Industria Azucarera 
(SNOIA, National Workers’ Union of the Sugar Industry) and the 
growth of the PCC from 350 members in 1930 to 6,000 in 1934.
In August 1933 the Machado regime faced a massive general 
strike which had started amongst Havana bus drivers and spread 
like wildfire. Desperate to save something from the situation, the 
dictator met the CNOC strike committee and agreed to meet all 
their demands. On the basis of an analysis that “the present gene-
ral strike is a step towards the revolution, but is not yet the revo-
lution itself” the CNOC, on advice from the PCC leadership and not 
without some bitter wrangling, called for a return to work once the 
economic demands had been achieved (ROJAS BLAQUIER, 2005, 
p. 180-181). The overwhelming majority of the striking workers, 
indeed most party members, took scant notice of the return to 
work order and the general strike continued until an army mutiny 
led by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista removed Machado and installed 
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a university professor, Ramón Grau San Martín, as president, and 
the radical nationalist Antonio Guiteras as Minister of the Interior.
So why did the PCC leadership make what became known as 
the August Mistake? There were obviously personal, subjective 
failings, but there is a logic flowing from the sectarianism of the 
Third Period that goes as follows: “A revolution is only genuine 
if it is led by the Communist Party. The Communist Party is not 
leading this general strike. Therefore this is not a real revolution”. 
However, once they realised their mistake, and perhaps determi-
ned to salvage their tarnished reputation, the PCC threw themsel-
ves enthusiastically into the sugar workers’ strikes which followed. 
Stressing “class against class” and denying the importance of race 
and nation made practical sense to the PCC in the multi-ethnic 
sugar industry.
6 SuGAR SOVIETS
The overthrow of the Machado dictatorship was accompanied 
by a wave of industrial action in the sugar industry. By 1932, wages 
in the industry were the lowest since the end of slavery almost half 
a century earlier. As the army and local authorities collapsed, this 
led to a weakening of the repressive apparatus of the state and 
created a space in which the sugar workers could take action. In 
many places the strike advanced into an occupation, with strike 
committees, supply committees and militias. This led Blas Roca, a 
mulatto shoemaker from Manzanillo and future general secretary 
of the PCC, to issue a call on behalf of the party to set up soviets. 
Many of the strike committees in the occupied plantations adopted 
the title “soviet”, although this was mainly giving a name to what 
they were already doing (CARR, 1996). 
Following an attack at the beginning of October 1933 on the 
Hotel Nacional, where much of the Army General Staff was holed 
up, Batista secured control of the army and began his rise to domi-
nate Cuban politics (KAPCIA, 2002, p. 287-289). The army then 
moved to crush the sugar workers’ insurgency. But it was not just 
the repression that brought it to an end; divisions between nati-
ve Cubans and immigrant workers from the British West Indies 
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and Haiti also played a role. The nationalist government of Ramón 
Grau introduced a Law for the Nationalisation of Labour, which 
provided that all firms must employ at least fifty percent native 
Cuban labour, and began to deport British West Indian and Haitian 
immigrants. In theory directed against the privileged position of 
Spanish workers in the economy, this law enabled politicians to 
channel Cuban workers’ demands into merely seeking employ-
ment at the expense of the foreign-born rather than genuine socia-
list measures. Many Afro-Cuban workers supported this measu-
re and the divisions weakened the sugar insurgency in some key 
areas. The PCC resolutely opposed the “50% law” from a princi-
pled anti-racist position and while this alienated many workers, it 
did attract a significant minority of class-conscious black Cubans 
(ROJAS BLAQUIER, 2006, p. 206-207).
Following the defeat of the 1933 sugar workers’ revolt, Batista 
consolidated his power and in January 1934 removed Grau from 
office and replaced him with a series of puppet governments. 
Despite increased repression, workers’ struggles, albeit increa-
singly of a defensive nature, continued until March 1935, when 
another general strike broke out. This time, the government decla-
red martial law and used the most extreme violence to force a 
return to work after 72 hours. The last remains of the revolutio-
nary wave that started in 1933 were broken, the CNOC was banned 
and the communist party was forced underground (PCC, 1985, p. 
332-340; ALEXANDER, 2002, p. 61-68).
7 POPuLAR FRONT
The defeat of the Cuban workers’ movement was not the only 
such defeat in the early 1930s. The rise to power of the Nazis in 
Germany over the destruction of one of the strongest working 
class movements in the world caused a rethink in the internatio-
nal communist movement. The 7th Komintern Congress in July/
August 1935 prioritised anti-fascist work and proposed the crea-
tion of Popular Fronts: alliances of all “progressive” forces against 
fascism. For the Cuban party, reeling from the defeat of the 1935 
general strike, this policy was knocking at an open door and was 
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enthusiastically endorsed by the PCC Central Committee in October 
1935 (ROJAS BLAQUIER, 2006, p. 8-16). 
The “progressive force” with which they were to form an allian-
ce was unlikely in the extreme. Fulgencio Batista was never accep-
ted by the Cuban upper classes, in part because of his mixed heri-
tage. He realised that he had a narrow social base and that, once 
he had defeated organised labour he might in turn become surplus 
to upper-class requirements. His arrangement with the communist 
party was in essence that he would, in return for their support, 
legalise the party and allow them to build a trade union confe-
deration, as well as enacting socially progressive legislation and 
allowing elections for an assembly to discuss a new constitution. 
The resulting 1940 constitution was the most progressive in Latin 
America. It included paid holidays, 48 hours pay for 44 hours work, 
reinstatement of workers victimised after the 1935 general stri-
ke, increased protection from dismissal and pension funds in the 
major industries (CANTóN NAVARRO, 2013, p. 52). The commu-
nists, now renamed the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP, People’s 
Socialist Party), became the leading lights in a new national trade 
union confederation, the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba 
(CTC, Cuban Confederation of Workers), whose general secretary 
was the Afro-Cuban communist Lázaro Peña.
During the Second World War, in order to gain popular support 
for its war against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the US govern-
ment tolerated reformist regimes in Latin America that introduced 
popular welfare measures and granted workers the right to orga-
nise. As long as the USSR was an ally of the United States, the PSP 
remained an acceptable part of the governing coalition. However, 
the situation changed radically after the defeat of the Axis Powers 
when the USSR quickly became the new “totalitarian” enemy of 
the self-designated “Free West”. Taking advantage of the changed 
situation, employers and governments looked for ways to rever-
se the wartime reforms and to restore profitability in the difficult 
post-war economic circumstances. The anti-Communist hysteria, 
which the US government generated by in order to justify the chan-
ge of policy towards the Soviet Union, was also used by ruling 
elites everywhere to purge trade unions of left-wing militants of all 
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political persuasions and to domesticate the remaining leaders, in 
order to restore a business-friendly atmosphere and increase profit 
margins at the expense of workers’ wages and conditions.
In the particular circumstances of Cuba in the late 1940s, 
this involved a mixture of government intervention and gangs-
ter violence. Following the 1944 elections, Batista was replaced 
by governments of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano - Auténtico 
(PRC-A, Cuban Revolutionary Party - Authentic), a liberal natio-
nalist party led by the same Ramón Grau San Martín who had 
briefly been president following the 1933 revolution. Despite 
these revolutionary roots, by the mid-1940s the Auténticos, as the 
PRC-A was commonly known, were committed to the economic 
and political status quo, were subservient to the sugar oligarchy 
and fully accepted Cuba’s subordinate relationship with the USA. 
However, the party faced one of the strongest trade union move-
ments in Latin America. Under pressure from the US ambassador, 
the Grau government encouraged its supporters in the union fede-
ration, known as the Comisión Obrera Nacional Auténtica (CONA, 
National Workers’ Commission of the PRC-A) led by Eusebio Mujal, 
to take over the CTC. The murder of two prominent Afro-Cuban 
communist trade union leaders serves to illustrate the onslaught 
(CUSHION, 2016b).
8 JESÚS MENéNDEZ
Jesús Menéndez joined the Cuban Communist Party in 1931 and 
a year later he became a founder member of the National Workers’ 
Union of the Sugar Industry (SNOIA). He contributed to the 1932-3 
wave of militancy as one of the leaders of the union local at Central 
Constancia, the sugar plantation where he worked. Between 1935 
and 1939 Jesús Menéndez was active in the sugar industry during 
the harvest period while working in the tobacco industry during 
the “dead season”, building his reputation as a militant workers’ 
leader in Las Villas province through his involvement in a stri-
ke at Central Constancia in 1936. The dispute was successful in 
achieving a twenty percent wage increase, but Menéndez was 
dismissed by his employers after the return to work. In 1937, the 
Steve CuShion
224  |  Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 12, n. 24, p. 197-220, 2016
regional labour movement was strong enough to call the Congreso 
Provincial Obrero de Las Villas (Provincial Workers’ Congress of 
Las Villas) and the following year Jesús Menéndez was elected its 
secretary-general. In 1939 Menéndez was elected to the founding 
executive committee of the CTC. That same year he helped form 
the Federación Nacional de los Obreros Azucareros (FNOA, National 
Federation of Sugar Workers) and was elected deputy general 
secretary, becoming general secretary the following year. Under his 
leadership, the FNOA merged with the unions of the engineers and 
administrators to form the Federación Nacional de los Trabajadores 
Azucareros (FNTA, National Federation of Sugar Industry Workers).
Jesús Menéndez was elected on a communist ticket as a 
congressional representative in 1942. Following the entry of the 
USA and the USSR into the Second World War, President Batista, 
who had been elected in 1940, appointed two communist party 
members to his cabinet; and the FNTA, under the leadership of 
Jesús Menéndez, made effective use of the communist party’s 
connections with government, as well as of the increased need 
of the United States for sugar imports, in order to improve the 
economic standing of sugar workers. It is estimated that the union 
negotiated wage increases for its members worth over 300 million 
dollars between 1941 and 1947 (SIMS,1993), although this has to 
be set against a very high rate of inflation for basic necessities 
during the war. The FNTA also won paid holidays and the setting 
up of a retirement fund.
After the Allied victory in 1945, the US government began 
negotiations for a new trade agreement with the intention of redu-
cing the cost of imported sugar. The FNTA sought the inclusion 
of organized labour in the official negotiating team, but the new 
President, Grau San Martín, initially refused and Jesús Menéndez 
went privately to Washington in an attempt to win US trade union 
support for the Cuban position. In the aftermath of the failed nego-
tiations, the Cuban government withheld part of the 1946 sugar 
harvest and President Truman sent his Secretary of Agriculture to 
negotiate directly in Havana. This time, Jesús Menéndez was inclu-
ded in the official negotiating team and succeeded in inserting a 
Guarantee Clause in the agreement which linked the price paid 
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for sugar to inflation in goods imported from the USA. This resul-
ted in a diferencial (differential) of 36 million dollars, from which 
the FNTA forced the government to distribute 25 million pesos 
amongst the sugar workers as a bonus.
The onset of the Cold War gave the government the opportu-
nity to rid itself of the Cuban communists. Once Minister of Labour 
Carlos Prío had managed to split the Confederation of Cuban 
Workers (CTC), he used his ministerial powers to ensure that anti-
communist CTC bureaucrats received official recognition and 
sole bargaining rights. While this was successful in many unions, 
a takeover of the more militant federations such as the dockers, 
tobacco workers and sugar workers required the use of police and 
gangster violence. Amongst those murdered was Jesús Menéndez, 
shot in the back by Captain Joaquín Casillas on Matanzas railway 
station while he was touring the country building support for a stri-
ke to defend the diferencial. His funeral in Havana in January 1948 
was attended by 150,000 people. The struggle to defend sugar 
workers’ pay and conditions continued under another communist, 
also of African heritage, Ursinio Rojas, but the murder of Jesús 
Menéndez was a severe blow to the Cuban labour movement 
(SIMS, 1993).
9 ARACELIO IGLESIAS
When both his parents died, Aracelio Iglesias went to live with 
family friends in Regla, across the bay from the city of Havana, 
where he started working on the docks at the age of 15. He came to 
the attention of some veteran communist port trade unionists who 
encouraged his involvement in the union and recruited him to the 
communist party in 1931. During the 1933 general strike the port of 
Havana was on strike for 19 days. Aracelio Iglesias was elected to 
the strike committee which went on to organize solidarity action 
during the tobacco workers strike at the end of that year. In 1934 
he was a picket organizer during a dock strike against the ships of 
the United Fruit Company. After several unsuccessful attempts to 
arrest him, Iglesias was finally detained and charged with posses-
sion of arms and explosives, for which he was imprisoned for three 
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years on the Isle of Pines. On his release in 1937, he returned to 
work in the port where, the following year, he was elected secre-
tary of the Sindicato de Estibadores y Jornaleros de la Bahía de La 
Habana (Union of Stevedores and Labourers of the Bay of Havana) 
and in 1939 to the national executive of the Federación Obrera 
Marítima Nacional (FOMN, National Maritime Workers’ Federation) 
as well as the national executive of the newly-formed CTC. Iglesias 
was keen to establish legally-determined wages for his members 
and represented the FOMN on the Comisión de Inteligencia del 
Puerto (Port Arbitration Committee), which set the rates for loading 
and unloading ships. But there was no enforcement mechanism 
for arbitration decisions and he did not hesitate to call strikes and 
boycotts against any company that was slow to comply. During 
the Second World War, because of German submarine activity, 
Havana became the sole authorized port in Cuba, which left the 
dockers in the rest of the country unemployed. Aracelio Iglesias 
negotiated a government subsidy to alleviate the hardship in the 
closed ports, while at the same time opening twenty percent of 
the Havana roster to dockers from the rest of the country. The 
war was a period of high inflation in Cuba, but the Havana FOMN 
was able to put sufficient pressure on the government to decree 
wage increases which went some way to keeping pace with the 
cost of living. His unyielding stance on these matters brought him 
into conflict with the major US shipping lines, who were using the 
wartime emergency to attack established wages and conditions of 
work.
The end of the Second World War saw an increased level of 
industrial disputes, with the employers attempting to increase 
productivity. In Havana there was constant conflict over mecha-
nization as the dock workers’ union opposed the introduction of 
bulk loading of sugar. The pro-business press directed considera-
ble animosity towards Aracelio Iglesias as the public face of the 
Havana dockers, with the news magazine Bohemia attacking him 
in an article entitled “The Most Expensive Port in the World”. US 
Senator Bradley, spokesman for the shipping lines, called him the 
“Red Czar of the Port” and his membership of the communist party 
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was used against him in the increasingly anti-communist atmos-
phere of the early Cold War. 
Despite the 1947 government purge that ended communist 
control of the trade unions, Aracelio Iglesias had a sufficient base of 
support to be re-elected FOMN secretary for the port of Havana by 
a mass meeting in March 1948. The government annulled the elec-
tion and the Navy and Maritime Police occupied the FOMN office, 
giving formal control of the union to supporters of the ruling party. 
This led to strikes and demonstrations, making it evident that the 
Havana dockers would not easily accept the imposed leadership. 
On 15th October 1948, a mass meeting voted to refuse to pay their 
union subscriptions. Two days later, Iglesias was shot in the back 
by two gunmen acting on behalf of the ruling party as he sat in the 
makeshift union office. Strikes broke out throughout the country in 
the days that followed and his funeral became a massive protest in 
itself. The murder of Aracelio Iglesias was a serious setback for the 
workers in the port of Havana, but their organization was strong 
enough to continue resisting productivity measures such that in 
1959, at the victory of the Cuban Revolution, bulk loading had still 
not been introduced (CANTóN NAVARRO, 1977).
10 PRODuCTIVITy
Eusebio Mujal, who become the new general secretary of the 
CTC in 1949, used his links to the government to secure enough 
economic gains for the union’s membership to maintain his posi-
tion and to prove that his grouping, referred to as mujalistas, were 
at least as effective as the communists they had replaced. Thus in 
1950, a Havana tram strike led by communists was defeated by 
police repression, while that same year bank workers were gran-
ted their demands on condition that they affiliated to the Auténtico-
controlled CTC. Reports from the British Ambassador in 1952 were 
still full of criticism of the “endless irresponsible demands of the 
labour movement”, which he blamed on Mujal who, he wrote, 
“imposed his will on the President and secured satisfaction for 
his every whim, however irresponsible and prejudicial to the long 
term interests of the country it might be” (CUSHION 2016a, p. 22). 
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The removal of the communists from office may have suited the 
Cold War foreign policy objectives of the US government, but did 
nothing in itself to improve the productivity of Cuban workers.
If economic conditions had become more difficult generally in 
the capitalist world during the post war period, Cuba was particu-
larly badly hit by the drop in world sugar prices. The employers’ 
obsession with productivity is described by the 1951 “Report on 
Cuba”, compiled by Francis Truslow for the World Bank affiliated 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, wherein 
the resistance of workers to mechanisation and other producti-
vity measures are clearly identified as the main problem facing 
the Cuban economy. The report argues that increased producti-
vity would attract investment, promote diversification and there-
by produce jobs. Underneath the pious rhetoric calling for greater 
co-operation between management and labour lay the concrete 
proposal to make dismissal of employees simpler, faster and chea-
per. The chronically-high level of unemployment deeply affected 
the consciousness of those in work and job security was always 
the prime concern of unionised workers (TRUSLOW, 1951, p. 
225-230; 338). 
Given the strength of the trade unions, there had been little 
possibility that the Truslow report could be implemented by an 
elected government, but rather required an authoritarian regime 
to enforce its proposals which, at least in the short term, could only 
result in a considerable increase in the already chronic level of 
unemployment. The army coup on 10th March 1952 that brought 
in the Batista dictatorship was widely seen in this light at the time. 
The main business newspaper, Diario de la Marina had been enthu-
siastically campaigning for Batista with a headline “Batista es el 
Hombre” (Batista is the Man). When Batista staged his coup, the 
US and British Embassies noted that businessmen were amongst 
the new regime’s most enthusiastic supporters. Within ten days of 
the coup, the country’s major business associations had visited the 
presidential palace to offer their support.
The majority of the trade union bureaucracy quickly came to 
an accommodation with the new regime and Mujal went on to 
become one of Batista’s most loyal collaborators. In return for this 
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collaboration, the government turned a blind eye to corrupt prac-
tices by Mujal’s supporters within the unions and obliged emplo-
yers to deduct trade union subscriptions from workers’ wages by 
means of a compulsory check-off, which isolated the CTC leader-
ship from rank and file pressure. Batista planned his attack on 
working conditions carefully. He had reached an accommodation 
with the CTC but could not move too quickly because, if he under-
mined Mujal’s position, that accommodation would be useless. His 
approach to restoring profitability was by defeating workers sector 
by sector, making sure that the field of battle was always chosen 
by the regime and that any chance of generalised industrial action 
was avoided. Nevertheless, despite the mujalista bureaucracy’s 
best efforts, the CTC was not monolithic and remained a workers’ 
organisation in which, as well as some honest, independent trade 
union leaders, the communists still had a level of influence. This 
was particularly true in the countryside where social legislation was 
not well enforced and, given that most urban bureaucrats avoided 
the rural areas, PSP members managed to retain a following.
However, the political situation in Cuba was to be turned upside 
down by the events of the 26th July 1953 when Fidel Castro led an 
unsuccessful attack on the Moncada barracks in Santiago, hoping 
to spark a nationwide insurrection. Having been falsely accused 
by the authorities of complicity in the Moncada attack, the PSP 
was included in the generally increased repression which followed 
the incident, despite condemning Castro’s actions as adventurist 
and arguing that such individual action disorientated the masses 
while giving the government an excuse for brutal repression. Their 
newspaper Hoy was closed down, the party was formally banned 
and the few remaining Communists were purged from the official 
CTC.
The year of 1955 was a one of intense class struggle in Cuba. 
Starting with a railway stoppage covering half the island and 
finishing with a strike by half a million sugar workers, the year also 
saw militant action by bank workers, telephonists, bus drivers, 
dockers, cigar rollers, brewers and textile workers. In every case 
the cause of the dispute was the perception by employers that they 
needed to drastically increase productivity in order to maintain 
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profit levels; a productivity drive that received the full support of 
the Batista dictatorship. 
The mujalista CTC bureaucracy facilitated this productivity drive 
by placing themselves at the head of any dispute and then almost 
immediately surrendering. Where workers refused to accept the 
actions of the trade union bureaucracy, the government used the 
police and army with considerable brutality to overcome remain-
ing resistance. In return for the support of the mujalistas, the 
Ministry of Labour used its extensive legal powers of interven-
tion to prevent aggrieved union members voting the incumbent 
bureaucrats out of office. 
When the sugar workers went on strike at the end of 1955 and 
found themselves faced with a level of repression only previously 
used to attack militant students, the sugar workers themselves 
turned to violence:  they set up road blocks, burnt cane fields 
and occupied town halls and city centres; actions that resulted in 
hundreds arrested or wounded, with Batista’s forces killing several 
strikers.
The strike was finally defeated, but this confrontation destroyed 
many illusions about the effectiveness of legal, peaceful protest 
and convinced a significant minority of workers that there was no 
longer any reformist solution to their problems (ROJAS BLAQUIER, 
1998). It is worth noting that this strike was conducted with a high 
level of inter-racial solidarity and that there were no reported divi-
sions between black and white workers of the sort that had been 
so detrimental in the 1930s.
The defeat of a well-organised strike by economically-powerful 
groups of workers with considerable experience in industrial activ-
ity made a group of militants in the city of Guantanamo realise 
that, unless the Batista regime could be militarily defeated, they 
would no longer be able to defend and advance their conditions 
and wages. Neither would they be able to regain control of their 
own trade union while Mujal and his cronies had the support of 
the state. From the start of the dictatorship in 1952, Guantanamo 
had been a centre of intense opposition to the Batista dictatorship 
but the limitations of peaceful methods were becoming obvious 
when faced with such a level of repression. So for instance when 
From the russian revolution to the Cuban revolution
Tensões Mundiais, ForTaleza, v. 12, n. 24, p. 197-220, 2016   |  231
Frank País, regional co-ordinator of Fidel Castro’s newly formed 
Movimiento Revolucionario 26 de Julio (July 26th Revolutionary 
Movement, MR-26-7) visited Guantanamo in September 1955, 
he recruited a railwayman called Octavio Louit  to form the local 
branch of the revolutionary organisation, an endeavour in which 
he was helped by another railway worker, Antonio “ñico” Torres. 
Torres and Louit proposed a tactic they called Sindicalismo beli-
gerente (trade unionism on a war footing), which combined mass 
action with sabotage, an approach that led telephone workers to 
cut phone lines, sugar workers to burn fields and railway workers 
to derail scab trains during strikes (COMA, 1981).
11 DIVIDED OPPOSITION
The strained relationship between the PSP and the rest of the 
anti-government opposition demonstrates the divisive effect of 
Cold War anti-communist propaganda. This, despite the complete 
lack of interest in Cuba displayed by the USSR until some time 
after the triumph of the revolution in 1959. So the PSP’s uncritical 
support of the USSR, in particular its support of the crushing of the 
Hungarian uprising in 1956, played into the hands of its enemies. 
These attitudes affected the relationship between the PSP and 
the MR-26-7. The bad start to relations as a result of the PSP’s 
condemnation of the Moncada attack continued and a distinct anti-
communist faction grew in the MR-26-7, particularly in Havana.
The division between these two organisations was much less 
noticeable in eastern Cuba where, particularly amongst militant 
workers, there was a much more collaborative attitude. This would 
prove important when Fidel Castro returned to Cuba at the end 
of 1956 and the MR-26-7 organised an armed uprising in eastern 
Cuba in order to divert the authorities’ attention from Castro’s 
landing in the Granma. The national leadership of the PSP was 
aware of the impending Granma landing, but they thought that the 
whole scheme was adventurist and wanted no part of it. However, 
the local PSP organisation in Santiago had cordial relations with 
the July 26th Movement and took a different view. As a result, the 
military actions of the MR-26-7 on 30th November 1956 received 
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the support of the Santiago communists led by Ladislao Carvajal, 
provincial secretary of the PSP, in defiance of a direct order from 
Havana. This cordial relationship was particularly important in the 
port. So, on the morning of the 30th November, Juan Taquechel, 
a leading Afro-Cuban communist militant on the Santiago docks, 
successfully pulled the port workers out on strike in support of the 
insurrection organised by the MR-26-7 (TAQUECHEL; POUMIER, 
2009, p. 120). 
Frank País instructed the MR-26-7 group in Guantanamo 
to prevent military reinforcements reaching Santiago from the 
Guantanamo region. This they achieved by a spectacular railway 
strike during which the whole network at the eastern end of the 
island was paralysed for five days, all the more impressive because 
the workers raised no demands other than to make it clear that 
they were acting in support of their comrades in Santiago. The rest 
of the town managed to maintain a general strike for a couple of 
days, while the workers in the processing plant of the Ermita sugar 
plantation, where the MR-26-7 had two active cells, successfully 
attacked the police barracks on the plantation. As a result of the 
success of the strike in Guantánamo, ñico Torres, now a wanted 
man, was made chair of a commission charged with extending 
sindicalismo beligerente nationwide and he spent the next year 
criss-crossing the island with this objective.
12 DEATH SQuADS
The government response to the start of rebel guerrilla acti-
vities in the Sierra Maestra was violent repression. It was quite 
common for a jeep full of plain-clothes police or off-duty soldiers 
to arrive outside the house of an opponent of the regime and shoot 
him in front of his family and neighbours. There were several mass 
demonstrations against this state-inspired terror in the early part of 
1957, with perhaps the most successful being the town-wide gene-
ral strike to protest against police and army brutality in Manzanillo 
on 28th January 1957, supported by a partial stoppage in the towns 
of Santiago and Contramaestre. Manzanillo had always been 
a communist party stronghold; it was, after all, the home town 
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of the party leader Blas Roca and was now the nearest town of 
any size to the rebels in the Sierra Maestra. There was a perso-
nal relationship between many local militants of the PSP and the 
MR-26-7 in Manzanillo. Local communists, particularly members 
of the PSP youth wing, the Juventud Socialista, often helped in the 
support networks for the rebel army, although how much of this 
was known to the leadership in Havana is uncertain.
In the summer of 1957, Frank País, now the MR-26-7 National 
Co-ordinator of Action, was based in Santiago from where he was 
working both to promote the movement’s clandestine operations 
and to organise support for the guerrillas in the nearby Sierra 
Maestra mountains. His murder at the end of July 1957 by a local 
police chief produced a general strike in Oriente province, which 
was probably the biggest public demonstration of opposition 
during the entire Batista dictatorship. Following his funeral, the 
whole city of Santiago de Cuba was shut down by a general strike 
which lasted 5 days. The strike spread to cover the entire eastern 
half of the island, but failed to reach Havana. Efforts to launch a 
strike in Havana on August 5th were unsuccessful outside of a few 
traditionally militant sectors such as public transport, due in part 
to some swift action by the mujalista bureaucracy. This strike gave 
the question of possible collaboration between the MR-26-7 and 
the PSP an increasing significance and there was some basis for 
the discussions which started in February 1958 with the arrival 
in the Sierra Maestra of a PSP delegate, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez 
(KAROL, 1970, p. 150). 
13 APRIL 9TH SETBACk
Discussions with the PSP had not advanced greatly by the time 
the MR-26-7 called a general strike on 9th April 1958. This strike, 
which received almost no working class support, was a complete 
disaster and cost the lives of many of the movement’s best under-
ground activists, as Batista’s chief of police issued the instruction: 
“No wounded, no prisoners”. The process of picking up the pieces 
began with a meeting of the MR-26-7 leadership on May 3rd at Los 
Altos de Mompié in the Sierra Maestra. From the point of view of 
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working class involvement in the insurrection, two important deci-
sions were taken, one of which was to give future priority to the 
guerrilla struggle, the other was to reorganise the M-26-7 work-
ers’ section, now called the Frente Obrera Nacional (FON - National 
Workers’ Front) under the leadership of ñico Torres. A new theme 
of the reorganised FON was a call to unity, which reflected the 
realignment towards the communists that was emerging from the 
discussions between Fidel Castro and the PSP delegate, Carlos 
Rafael Rodríguez. 
The terror unleashed by the regime following the strike of 9 
April 1958, widely reported in the PSP press, convinced the party’s 
leadership that there was no possibility of a legal solution to 
the crisis and that there was a need for armed protection befo-
re workers would take further action. It had also become clear 
that the MR-26-7 was now, irrespective of the defeated strike, 
the centre of opposition to Batista and other political organisa-
tions would have to re-orientate toward them. The PSP national 
leadership therefore decided, towards the end of April, to publicly 
support the guerrillas.
Going on strike in Batista’s Cuba could be a life or death deci-
sion and workers had to feel some confidence in their chances of 
survival and in the possibilities of successfully gaining a result that 
would be in their political and economic interests. In the summer 
of 1958, however, the guerrillas still had to beat the encircling 
forces of Batista’s army, which outnumbered them enormously. 
The army and police, while they had demonstrated ruthless effi-
ciency when shooting down poorly armed students or unarmed 
striking workers, were not nearly so determined when faced with 
well trained and politically motivated guerrillas, who rapidly gained 
the military upper hand in the second half of 1958. There was a 
parallel growth in financial support coming from workers through 
late summer and autumn, as well as the increase in membership 
of the FON, which was estimated at 15,000 by the end of the year 
(ALEXANDER, 2002, p. 159).
Discussions aimed at uniting all oppositional workers’ organi-
sations started on 21st June at a meeting between the MR-26-7 
and the PSP although final agreement was not reached until 10th 
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November when the Frente Obrero Nacional Unido (FONU, United 
National Workers’ Front) was launched (PCC 1985, p. 352-360). 
Two “Workers’ Congresses in Liberated Territory” were called in 
the name of FONU at the end of 1958, one in the Sierra Cristal 
mountains in the area controlled by the rebels’ Second Eastern 
Front, led by Raúl Castro, and the other in northern Las Villas 
province in the area controlled by rebel forces under the command 
of Camilo Cienfuegos, who appointed a communist bus driver, 
Gerardo Nogueras, to head his workers’ commission and asked the 
veteran PSP sugar worker, Ursinio Rojas, to address the congress. 
In a gesture of repudiation of the racism that had so undermined 
the 1933 revolution leading to the 1935 counter-revolution, the 
congress in the Sierra Cristal deliberately appointed a descen-
dent of Haitian immigrants as president of the session (CARDONA 
BORY, [1995]). 
These congresses gave the rebel movement considerably 
increased legitimacy in working class circles, also showing that 
the PSP and MR-26-7 forces amongst organised labour were publi-
cly united and capable of creating an alternative organisational 
structure. They were important events in themselves, the difficul-
ties involved in assembling several hundred delegates in condi-
tions of dictatorship and civil war showing an impressive level 
of organisation. But they are crucial to understanding how the 
revolutionary general strike that overthrew Batista was organised 
and proved so powerful that it pulled the rest of the population in 
behind it. This next strike was planned to start in January 1959 to 
coincide with the start of the sugar harvest, thereby maximising its 
economic effect. In the event, these preparations had to be brought 
forward to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the flight 
of Batista on New Year’s Day 1959.
However, there was a real possibility that an army coup, parti-
cularly if it was led by an honourable patriotic officer without 
previous close association with Batista, could have split some 
of the middle class support away from the MR-26-7 and prolon-
ged the civil war. As the rebels moved in to seize Santiago on 
New Year’s Morning 1959, Fidel Castro spoke over the radio to 
condemn the coup attempts and to call for a revolutionary general 
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strike. This call was directed at all workers in territory not yet libe-
rated and told them to organise in all workplaces to totally paraly-
se the country. From the moment the call went out, the strike was 
complete. Fidel Castro himself affirmed that the general strike was 
decisive in delivering the fortresses of the capital of the republic, in 
defeating the final manoeuvres of the enemies of the people and in 
giving all power to the revolution (CUSHION 2016b, p. 198).
The strike provided such powerful evidence of the overwhel-
ming popularity of the rebel victory that the army chiefs quickly 
abandoned their plans for a military coup. Furthermore, the stri-
ke gave an authority to the MR-26-7 militias that were keeping 
order in the streets of Havana for that first week in January, thereby 
preventing the scenes of violent disorder and lynch mob rule that 
had followed the downfall of Machado. Another important aspect 
of the general strike was the way in which it placed the MR-26-7 in 
complete control. The popular reaction to Fidel Castro’s triumphant 
passage from Santiago to Havana demonstrated quite clearly who 
the new power in the land was.
14 CONCLuSION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PSP 
AND THE MR-26-7
The growth of the MR-26-7 had inevitably brought its member-
ship into contact with PSP militants at workplace level. The dynam-
ics of workplace organisation forced these two groups of militants 
to interact and, while there was continued political debate and 
disagreement, a process of convergence started to occur consid-
erably before the developing relationship at leadership level. A 
good example of this is the history of active solidarity between the 
largely Afro-Cuban Santiago port workers led by the communist 
Juan Taquechel and the mainly white workers in the city’s Bacardí 
distillery led by MR-26-7 militant Ramón Álvarez, which was a 
crucial factor in Juan Taquechel’s decision to lead the dockers out 
on strike in support of the MR-26-7 uprising on 30th November 
1956.
The differences between the two organisations were largely 
tactical, with the PSP promoting unarmed mass struggle, while the 
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MR-26-7 saw the need for armed action to defeat the forces of 
state repression. Both organisations placed the general strike at 
the centre of their approach, but they had a very different concep-
tion of the tactic. To the PSP it represented a traditional stoppa-
ge of work by the overwhelming majority of workers, who would 
thereby achieve their objective by sheer weight of numbers and by 
paralysing the economy. To the MR-26-7, the general strike was 
more akin to a mass armed popular insurrection. As opposition 
to the Batista regime grew, the difference between these tacti-
cal approaches was tested in practice. The PSP leadership learnt 
the need for armed support, while the M-26-7 leadership realised 
that popular support could not just be summoned, but had to be 
built by relating their propaganda to workers’ economic and social 
interests.
A view of the Cuban Revolution which sees the rebel victory 
as entirely the work of the guerrilla army will necessarily see little 
contribution from the communists. If the role of organised labour 
is taken into account, the communist contribution becomes consi-
derably more significant, as this is the area in which they operated 
most effectively. The communist party was also the major organi-
sation of Afro-Cuban workers, who represented at least a third of 
the membership. Thus, the systematic agitation and propaganda by 
communist militants was a key factor in helping maintain indepen-
dent working-class organisation, while their organisational expe-
rience and pre-existing militant networks complemented the work 
of the MR-26-7 workers’ section. The party’s constant anti-racist 
propaganda, which they linked to anti-imperialism by repeatedly 
drawing attention to the disgraceful oppression of Afro-Americans 
in the US South, helped to maintain that inter-racial solidarity that is 
so important to successful industrial action. The PSP had some very 
impressive Afro-Cuban clandestine working class organisers, most 
of whom are forgotten because of the necessary anonymity forced 
on militants during a brutal dictatorship. Two whose trajectory is 
known can stand for many others. The first is sugar worker Pablo 
Sandoval, whose name is on many documents in the Camaguey 
provincial archive, first as secretary of the provincial federation of 
the CTC until 1948, then signing leaflets appealing for resistance 
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in the name of various communist front organisations. He went 
underground and was particularly in evidence around the sugar 
strike in Central Estrella in 1955 and then reappears in 1959 after the 
rebel victory calling for unity on the May Day march. The second, 
Vicente Pérez, was a communist tobacco worker from Caibarien 
who was at the founding conference of the CTC and was working 
full time as a party industrial organiser by 1957, actively supporting 
the dock workers fight against mechanisation. He was sent to Pinar 
del Río province to help organise tobacco workers in 1958.
In circumstances where a regime is prepared to use high levels 
of brutality to suppress workers’ attempts to defend their wages 
and conditions, then conventional methods of mass action, such 
as the strike, the demonstration or the boycott, are insufficient. 
Equally, armed guerrilla action without mass support normally 
leads to isolation and defeat. The victory of the revolutionary forces 
in Cuba in 1959 was due to a successful combination of these 
tactics, while the important contribution of militant Afro-Cuban 
workers to the “red-thread” that links the Russian Revolution to 
the Cuban Revolution has been unfairly neglected.
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